Reputational bidding
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Professional advice
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
- Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
Cited in
(12)- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
- Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values
- Seller Reputation
- Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
- Information design in multistage games
- Auctions with signaling bidders: optimal design and information disclosure
- Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
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