Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00725-1MaRDI QIDQ2021808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miguel Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni, Miltiadis Makris

Publication date 27 April 2021

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsdisclosureexperimentssignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A truth serum for non-Bayesians: correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes
• Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Reputational bidding
• Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
• Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions

Cited in

(9)

• All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• A note on buyers' behavior in auctions with an outside option
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study
• Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• Z-Tree

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