Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2495MaRDI QIDQ1289253zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel

Publication date 5 September 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dbe2c12622160e7309054745f6156c6fd4ca193c

zbMATH Keywords

social learningEnglish auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226090 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1232374 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A course in game theory.
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• The chain store paradox

Cited in

(6)

• Informational herding, optimal experimentation, and contrarianism
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
• Congested observational learning
• Herding with collective preferences
• Learning direction theory and the winner's curse
• Information cascades in the labor market

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