Congested observational learning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.006zbMath1302.91031OpenAlexW2152127765MaRDI QIDQ485808

Andrea Galeotti, Navin Kartik, Erik Eyster, Matthew Rabin

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58748/

zbMATH Keywords

queueingsocial learningcongestioninformation aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (6)

The implications of pricing on social learning ⋮ Social learning with coordination motives ⋮ Payoff externalities and social learning ⋮ On the role of responsiveness in rational herds ⋮ Observational learning in large anonymous games ⋮ Strategic experimentation in queues

Cites Work

• Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
• Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Herding with collective preferences
• Social learning with private and common values
• Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
• Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets
• Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Strategic experimentation in queues
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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