Congested observational learning
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Publication:485808
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.06.006zbMATH Open1302.91031OpenAlexW2152127765MaRDI QIDQ485808FDOQ485808
Authors: Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, Navin Kartik, Matthew Rabin 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58748/
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Cites Work
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Bayesian learning in social networks
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- On the convergence of informational cascades
- Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
- Herding with collective preferences
- Social learning with private and common values
- Herding and contrarian behavior in financial markets
- Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
- Strategic experimentation in queues
- Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
- Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information
- Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
Cited In (9)
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- Observational learning in large anonymous games
- Learning with limited bandwidth and attention to others' learning
- The implications of pricing on social learning
- On the role of responsiveness in rational herds
- Strategic experimentation in queues
- Sequential choice and non-Bayesian observational learning
- Payoff externalities and social learning
- Social learning with coordination motives
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