Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
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Publication:1277477
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00008-5zbMATH Open0916.90056MaRDI QIDQ1277477FDOQ1277477
Authors: James A. Dearden 
Publication date: 6 July 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
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- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games
Cited In (7)
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*
- Public goods with congestion
- On voluntary and efficient allocations
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
- Incentive-compatible cost-allocation schemes
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