Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Optimal Auction Design
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
Cited in
(7)- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*
- Public goods with congestion
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- On voluntary and efficient allocations
- Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
- Incentive-compatible cost-allocation schemes
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