On voluntary and efficient allocations

DOI10.1111/IJET.12064zbMATH Open1398.91395OpenAlexW2139958853MaRDI QIDQ4584757FDOQ4584757

Authors Burak Ünveren

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12064

zbMATH Keywords

irreducibilityPareto efficiencydisequilibriumvoluntary trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Trade models (91B60)

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Cited in

(7)

• Pareto efficiency in the jungle
• On the efficiency of market equilibrium in production economies.
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
• Voluntary and Efficient Allocations are Walrasian
• Equal rights to trade and mediate
• On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium
• On the optimality of not allocating

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