The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
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Publication:665079
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.003zbMATH Open1278.91060OpenAlexW3121343809MaRDI QIDQ665079FDOQ665079
Authors: Guillaume Cheikbossian
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3224/1/wp_ipdm_85_2009.pdf
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Cites Work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- Contest success functions
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
- Dynamic rent-seeking games
- The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
- Dynamic Behaviour in Large Markets for Differentiated Products
- Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets
Cited In (8)
- Optimal prize allocations in group contests
- On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts
- Campaigning internally or externally
- The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction
- Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
- Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking
- The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
- The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
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