Consequences of fluctuating group size for the evolution of cooperation
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Abstract: Studies of cooperation have traditionally focused on discrete games such as the well-known prisoner's dilemma, in which players choose between two pure strategies: cooperation and defection. Increasingly, however, cooperation is being studied in continuous games that feature a continuum of strategies determining the level of cooperative investment. For the continuous snowdrift game, it has been shown that a gradually evolving monomorphic population may undergo evolutionary branching, resulting in the emergence of a defector strategy that coexists with a cooperator strategy. This phenomenon has been dubbed the 'tragedy of the commune'. Here we study the effects of fluctuating group size on the tragedy of the commune and derive analytical conditions for evolutionary branching. Our results show that the effects of fluctuating group size on evolutionary dynamics critically depend on the structure of payoff functions. For games with additively separable benefits and costs, fluctuations in group size make evolutionary branching less likely, and sufficiently large fluctuations in group size can always turn an evolutionary branching point into a locally evolutionarily stable strategy. For games with multiplicatively separable benefits and costs, fluctuations in group size can either prevent or induce the tragedy of the commune. For games with general interactions between benefits and costs, we derive a general classification scheme based on second derivatives of the payoff function, to elucidate when fluctuations in group size help or hinder cooperation.
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Effects of relatedness on the evolution of cooperation in nonlinear public goods games
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- Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size
- Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas
- Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
- On inferring evolutionary stability in finite populations using infinite population models
- Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game
- Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
- The rise and fall of cooperation in populations with multiple groups
- The joint evolution of cooperation and competition
- The hitchhiker's guide to adaptive dynamics
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas
- Evolutionary branching in deme-structured populations
- Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action
- Individual-based competition between species with spatial correlation and aggregation
- Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games
- Relationship between aggregation of rewards and the possibility of polymorphism in continuous snowdrift games
- The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay
- Effects of group size and population size on the evolutionary stability of cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations
- On the size and structure of group cooperation
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