Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
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Publication:1994622
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.06.007zbMATH Open1402.91044OpenAlexW2166720633MaRDI QIDQ1994622FDOQ1994622
Authors: Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Fernando Vega-Redondo 
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Population dynamics and games of variable size
- The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay
- Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
- The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma
- A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
- Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm
- Social hierarchy and the evolution of behavior
- Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
- Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
- Cooperation, punishment and immigration
- Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
- The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
- Matching markets and cultural selection
- Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- Disbandment rules that most facilitate the evolution of cooperation
- Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
- A structured population model suggests that long life and post-reproductive lifespan promote the evolution of cooperation
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