Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.019zbMATH Open1279.91022OpenAlexW3125705566MaRDI QIDQ765211FDOQ765211

Nobue Suzuki, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.019

Recommendations

• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Trust and social efficiencies
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zbMATH Keywords

informationcooperationprisoner's dilemmarandom matchingvoluntary separation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Social norms and random matching games
• Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation

Cited In (4)

• Trust and social efficiencies
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance

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