Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.019MaRDI QIDQ765211zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Nobue Suzuki

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.019

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationinformationprisoner's dilemmarandom matchingvoluntary separation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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Cites work

• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Social norms and random matching games
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Cited in

(4)

• Trust and social efficiencies
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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