Cooperation, punishment and immigration

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.002zbMath1369.91153OpenAlexW1167998357MaRDI QIDQ893395

Brian W. Rogers, Paolo Pin

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesnetwork formationsocial behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

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• The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market
• The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows

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