Cooperation, punishment and immigration
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Publication:893395
- Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Anonymous games with binary actions
- Building up social capital in a changing world
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- Microeconomic theory
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Starting small and commitment
- Starting small and renegotiation
- The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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