Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3442447 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Elements of applied bifurcation theory
- Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
- Evolving cooperation
- MATCONT
- Population models with singular equilibrium
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
Cited in
(26)- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Mercenary punishment in structured populations
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
- Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games
- Learn good from bad: effects of good and bad neighbors in spatial prisoners' dilemma games
- Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
- Persistent cooperators in nature
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
- Cooperation, punishment and immigration
- Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
- Evolution of cooperation in public goods games
- Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics
- Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism
- Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Direct reciprocity and model-predictive strategy update explain the network reciprocity observed in socioeconomic networks
- Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games
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