Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
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Publication:745064
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.11.034zbMATH Open1322.91019OpenAlexW2046533010WikidataQ42680358 ScholiaQ42680358MaRDI QIDQ745064FDOQ745064
Authors: Fabio Dercole, Marco De Carli, F. Della Rossa, Alessandro Vittorio Papadopoulos 
Publication date: 13 October 2015
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034
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Cites Work
- MATCONT
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
- Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
- Elements of applied bifurcation theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Evolving cooperation
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Population models with singular equilibrium
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
Cited In (15)
- Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
- Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism
- Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games
- Learn good from bad: effects of good and bad neighbors in spatial prisoners' dilemma games
- Cooperation, punishment and immigration
- Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- Direct reciprocity and model-predictive strategy update explain the network reciprocity observed in socioeconomic networks
- Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
- Evolution of cooperation in public goods games
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