Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games

DOI10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554zbMath1482.91014OpenAlexW2883269527WikidataQ129496083 ScholiaQ129496083MaRDI QIDQ5027772

Yuying Zhu, Qiaoyu Li, Jianlei Zhang, Zeng-Qiang Chen

Publication date: 7 February 2022

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreplicator dynamicscomplex systemscooperative systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
• Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
• Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games

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