Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
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Publication:5027772
DOI10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554zbMath1482.91014OpenAlexW2883269527WikidataQ129496083 ScholiaQ129496083MaRDI QIDQ5027772
Yuying Zhu, Qiaoyu Li, Jianlei Zhang, Zeng-Qiang Chen
Publication date: 7 February 2022
Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554
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