Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
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Publication:952769
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.09.004zbMATH Open1151.91435OpenAlexW2047984623MaRDI QIDQ952769FDOQ952769
Authors: Roberto Galbiati, Pietro Vertova
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/2k2jnd64aa9g19nja481vjohq3
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Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
- The public goods game with a new form of shared reward
- Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
- Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games
- Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
- Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games
- The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior
- Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
- Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
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