Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019zbMath1342.91013OpenAlexW2135340466WikidataQ50766688 ScholiaQ50766688MaRDI QIDQ530467

Jianlei Zhang, Tianguang Chu, Franz J. Weissing

Publication date: 1 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationspeculationpunishmentpublic goods games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

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• Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation