Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
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Publication:721763
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2018.03.029zbMATH Open1394.91045OpenAlexW2796282815WikidataQ130029269 ScholiaQ130029269MaRDI QIDQ721763FDOQ721763
Authors: Ryo Matsuzawa, Jun Tanimoto 
Publication date: 20 July 2018
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2018.03.029
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Cites Work
- Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Spatial prisoner's dilemma games with increasing neighborhood size and individual diversity on two interdependent lattices
- Statistical physics of vaccination
- Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
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