Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2018.03.029zbMath1394.91045OpenAlexW2796282815WikidataQ130029269 ScholiaQ130029269MaRDI QIDQ721763

Ryo Matsuzawa, Jun Tanimoto

Publication date: 20 July 2018

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2018.03.029

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmapunishmentsanction with jealousy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Cites Work

• Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
• Statistical physics of vaccination
• Spatial prisoner's dilemma games with increasing neighborhood size and individual diversity on two interdependent lattices
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
• Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare

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