Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
- Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Spatial prisoner's dilemma games with increasing neighborhood size and individual diversity on two interdependent lattices
- Statistical physics of vaccination
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
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