Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.021zbMath1302.91023arXiv1408.2610OpenAlexW2963507048WikidataQ47836673 ScholiaQ47836673MaRDI QIDQ485662

Zhi-Xi Wu, Peng-Bi Cui

Publication date: 13 January 2015

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.2610

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypunishmentpair approximationidentifying probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Heterogeneity reproductive ability promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Small world can alleviate the social dilemmas originating from self-regulation or community policing issues ⋮ Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game ⋮ Promoting cooperation by punishing minority ⋮ Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary potential games on lattices ⋮ Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Cites Work

• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Strategy abundance in \(2\times 2\) games for arbitrary mutation rates
• Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
• Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Environmental versus demographic variability in stochastic predator–prey models

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