Persistent cooperators in nature

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2010.09.034zbMATH Open1414.91052arXiv1006.2931OpenAlexW2042962020WikidataQ33349865 ScholiaQ33349865MaRDI QIDQ1736293FDOQ1736293

Authors: Xinsheng Liu, Wanlin Guo 

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The evolution and maintenance of cooperation fascinated researchers for several decades. Recently, theoretical models and experimental evidence show that costly punishment may facilitate cooperation in human societies, but may not be used by winners. The puzzle how the costly punishment behaviour evolves can be solved under voluntary participation. Could the punishers emerge if participation is compulsory? Is the punishment inevitably a selfish behaviour or an altruistic behaviour? The motivations behind punishment are still an enigma. Based on public goods interactions, we present a model in which just a certain portion of the public good is divided equally among all members. The other portion is distributed to contributors when paying a second cost. Contributors who are willing to pay a second cost can be costly (and then altruistic) punishers, but they can also flourish or dominate the population, in this case we may call them "advantageous punishers". We argue that most of successful cooperators and punishers in nature are advantageous punishers, and costly punishment mostly happens in humans. This indicates a universal surviving rule: contributing more and gaining more. Our models show theoretically that the original motivation behind punishment is to retrieve deserved payoff from their own contributions, a selfish incentive.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1006.2931

Recommendations

• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationpunishmentpublic goodspersistent cooperator (PC)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The evolution of cooperation
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms

Cited In (4)

• Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Cooperation in defence against a predator
• Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games

Uses Software

• Dynamo

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