A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80018-1zbMath0833.90135MaRDI QIDQ1890912

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selection; noncooperative games; one-point solution concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

Related Items

Equilibrium Selection via Optimal Transport, List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997, Effective choice in all the symmetric \(2\times 2\) games, Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games, Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?, Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games, Games with imperfectly observable commitment, Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result, Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture, Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information, The noncooperative transportation problem and linear generalized Nash games, On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten, Prisoners' other dilemma, An experimental study of costly coordination, From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence, Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

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