Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108558MaRDI QIDQ2324693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108558

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsjoint ownershiplimited liabilityproperty rightsrent seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• The Management of Innovation
• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
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Cites work

• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights
• Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
• Self-organizing teams
• The Management of Innovation
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design

Cited in

(14)

• Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
• Optimal assignment of principalship and residual distribution for cooperative R\&D
• Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• The Management of Innovation
• Partnerships based on joint ownership
• The cost of appropriation and firm boundaries

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