Attorney fees in repeated relationships
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Publication:2326193
DOI10.1007/S00712-018-0633-1zbMath1425.91254OpenAlexW2367512909MaRDI QIDQ2326193
Publication date: 7 October 2019
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0633-1
Cites Work
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
- Optimal retention in agency problems
- An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation
- When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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