Attorney fees in repeated relationships

DOI10.1007/S00712-018-0633-1zbMath1425.91254OpenAlexW2367512909MaRDI QIDQ2326193

Brad Graham, Jack Robles

Publication date: 7 October 2019

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0633-1

zbMATH Keywords

contractlegal servicescontingent feerepeated relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

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