Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844672
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.06.014zbMATH Open1181.91095OpenAlexW1999072712MaRDI QIDQ844672FDOQ844672
Authors: Arthur Hau 
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.014
Recommendations
- Optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity and incentive compatibility
- Optimal coverage for incompletely reliable insurance
- Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
- Budget-constrained optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity
- Optimal insurance under the insurer's risk constraint
- Optimal insurance with divergent beliefs about insurer total default risk
- Optimal insurance under maxmin expected utility
- Optimal robust insurance with a finite uncertainty set
- Optimal insurance with adverse selection
- Pareto-optimal insurance under heterogeneous beliefs and incentive compatibility
revelation principleclaim falsificationinexact verificationoptimal indemnity scheduleoptimal insurance contract
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Replacement cost endorsement and opportunistic fraud in automobile insurance
- The cost of false alarms in Hellman and rainbow tradeoffs
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
- Optimal claim behaviour for third-party liability insurances with perfect information
- Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts
This page was built for publication: Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q844672)
