Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.09.025MaRDI QIDQ2389313zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre M. Picard

Publication date 15 July 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationinsurancecredibilitygood faithrisk verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
• Insuring nonverifiable losses
• Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity
• Information design in competitive insurance markets
• Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

Cites work

• Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
• Game theory
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

Cited in

(2)

• Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
• Optimal premium pricing in a competitive stochastic insurance market with incomplete information: a Bayesian game-theoretic approach

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