Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0024-5MaRDI QIDQ2462899zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Levent Koçkesen, Saltuk Ozerturk

Publication date 5 December 2007

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0024-5

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingadverse selectionexclusivityendogenous outside optionsrelationship financing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
• Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
• Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

Cites work

• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective

Cited in

(3)

• The role of lender behavior in international project finance
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
• When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability

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