Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0024-5zbMATH Open1274.91469OpenAlexW2119940992MaRDI QIDQ2462899FDOQ2462899

Authors: Levent Koçkesen, Saltuk Ozerturk 

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0024-5

Recommendations

• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
• Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
• Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingadverse selectionexclusivityendogenous outside optionsrelationship financing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
• Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

Cited In (3)

• The role of lender behavior in international project finance
• When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing

This page was built for publication: Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2462899)