Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities
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Publication:4446335
Recommendations
Cited in
(17)- Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard
- The price of `one person, one vote'
- The two-stage model of entrepreneurs financing based on the entry/exit decision
- Stable unions
- Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship
- Security design with status concerns
- Monitoring innovation
- Convertible securities and control rights in venture firms
- Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
- Convertibles in Sequential Financing*
- Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
- Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *
- The performance of venture capital investments: failure risk, valuation uncertainty \& venture characteristics
- Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
- Two-sided asymmetric information and convertible securities in venture financing
- Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt
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