Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *
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Recommendations
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Cited in
(29)- Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
- Investor competition and project risk in venture capital investments
- Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns
- Multistage effort and the equity structure of venture investment based on reciprocity motivation
- A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
- The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
- Entrepreneurial incentives and the role of initial coin offerings
- The stochastic incentive effect of venture capital in partnership systems with the asymmetric bistable Cobb-Douglas utility
- The optimal exit of staged investment when consider the posterior probability
- Security design with status concerns
- Security Design in Initial Public Offerings*
- Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
- Convertible securities and control rights in venture firms
- Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
- Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing
- Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
- Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities
- Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions
- Taxes and Venture Capital Support *
- The performance of venture capital investments: failure risk, valuation uncertainty \& venture characteristics
- The contract model of two-staged venture capital financing based on double-sized adverse selection
- Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability
- FINANCING VENTURES
- Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection
- Two-sided asymmetric information and convertible securities in venture financing
- The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
- Optimal contingent payment mechanisms and entrepreneurial financing decisions
- The incentive effect of venture capital in bilateral partnership systems with the bias mono-stable Cobb-Douglas utility
- Venture capital financed investments in intellectual capital
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