Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.006zbMATH Open1302.91131OpenAlexW3125612039MaRDI QIDQ485745FDOQ485745

Authors: Luís Vasconcelos 

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/12309/1/Contract_Signal_Investment_Final.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationexclusivityrelationship-specific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

Cited In (7)

• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory
• Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship
• Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)

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