Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship

DOI10.1162/003355302760193968zbMath1037.91067OpenAlexW2066217278MaRDI QIDQ4789654

Jonathan Levin

Publication date: 2002

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ea3484349f4fd1146de011b1c09057df3794e990

zbMATH Keywords

performancecontractscommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition ⋮ Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers ⋮ Moral hazard and subjective evaluation ⋮ Matching with peer monitoring ⋮ The nature of tournaments ⋮ Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations ⋮ Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence

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