On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
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Publication:1604522
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2868zbMath1008.91009MaRDI QIDQ1604522
Publication date: 4 July 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2868
Related Items
Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring, Moral hazard and private monitoring, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, On sustaining cooperation without public observations, Repeated games with almost-public monitoring, Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication, Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring, Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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