On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private (Q1604522)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1763750
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1763750 |
Statements
On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private (English)
0 references
4 July 2002
0 references
The author presents an analysis of failing to cooperate when monitoring is private. It is shown that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies yields players a value close to mutual min-max. Robustness of the results are given in theorems and lemma as well as definations. It is an interesting theoretical paper.
0 references
equilibrium
0 references
mutual minmax
0 references
perturbation
0 references
0 references
0.7679304480552673
0 references
0.7446092367172241
0 references
0.742517352104187
0 references
0.739997923374176
0 references
0.7397655248641968
0 references
