The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting

DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1183zbMath1489.91022OpenAlexW3210641039WikidataQ113749912 ScholiaQ113749912MaRDI QIDQ5085154

Dae Hyun Kim, Xiaoxi Li

Publication date: 27 June 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1183

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremtime-inconsistencypublic monitoringsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumperfect public equilibriumtime-dependent discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Mathematical Foundations of Game Theory
• Uniform value for some nonexpansive optimal control problems with general evaluations
• On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing

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