The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2021.1183MaRDI QIDQ5085154zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Dae Hyun Kim, Xiaoxi Li

Publication date 27 June 2022

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1183

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremtime-inconsistencypublic monitoringsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumperfect public equilibriumtime-dependent discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
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• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Repeated Games
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Repeated games with general discounting
• Repeated games with present-biased preferences
• Repeated games with probabilistic horizon
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Uniform value for some nonexpansive optimal control problems with general evaluations

Cited in

(13)

• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
• Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games
• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Repeated games with present-biased preferences
• A note on payments in the lab for infinite horizon dynamic games with discounting
• Intertemporal hedging and trade in repeated games with recursive utility
• Repeated games with general discounting
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620859 (Why is no real title available?)

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