The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2021.1183zbMATH Open1489.91022OpenAlexW3210641039WikidataQ113749912 ScholiaQ113749912MaRDI QIDQ5085154FDOQ5085154

Authors: Dae Hyun Kim, Xiaoxi Li 

Publication date: 27 June 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1183

Recommendations

• Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting
• A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremtime-inconsistencypublic monitoringsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumperfect public equilibriumtime-dependent discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
• General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games
• Repeated Games
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Sequential Equilibria
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Repeated games with present-biased preferences
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• General limit value in dynamic programming
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Limit value for optimal control with general means
• Repeated games with probabilistic horizon
• Mathematical foundations of game theory
• Repeated games with general discounting
• Uniform value for some nonexpansive optimal control problems with general evaluations

Cited In (12)

• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• A note on payments in the lab for infinite horizon dynamic games with discounting
• Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games
• A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
• Repeated games with general discounting
• Repeated games with present-biased preferences
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences

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