scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620859

zbMATH Open1177.91032MaRDI QIDQ3639780FDOQ3639780

Authors: Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin 

Publication date: 26 October 2009

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriumsequential equilibriumfull dimensionalityindividually rational payoff vectorinfinitely-repeated gameone-shot game of complete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cited In (4)

• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repeated games with incomplete information on one side: The case of different discount factors

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