scientific article; zbMATH DE number 980428

zbMATH Open0867.90137MaRDI QIDQ4333395FDOQ4333395

Authors: James W. Friedman, Larry Samuelson 

Publication date: 9 April 1997

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Recommendations

• An extension of the ``folk theorem with continuous reaction functions
• Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Continuous reaction functions in duopolies

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumoligopoly theoryreaction functionfolk theorem for repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (7)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
• An extension of the ``folk theorem with continuous reaction functions
• Dismissals and quits in repeated games
• Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• The folk theorem revisited

This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4333395)