Bad reputation with simple rating systems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.019zbMATH Open1530.91306OpenAlexW4385727931MaRDI QIDQ6148366FDOQ6148366

Daniel Monte, Caio Lorecchio

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.019

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityrating systemsbad reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Learning with Finite Memory
• Bad Reputation
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• Learning with bounded memory in games
• Plausible cooperation

Cited In (2)

• Reputation-based persuasion platforms
• Partial credence goods on review platforms

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