Partial credence goods on review platforms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.002MaRDI QIDQ6665693zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ronen Gradwohl, Artyom Jelnov

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

credence goodsefficiencyevidencereview platform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Welfare-improving cascades and the effect of noisy reviews
• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• New, like new, or very good? Reputation and credibility

Cites work

• Bad Reputation
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• Implementation with evidence
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Motivational ratings
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation Building under Observational Learning
• Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
• Seller Reputation
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(1)

• Equilibrium information in credence goods

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