Partial credence goods on review platforms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.002MaRDI QIDQ6665693FDOQ6665693

Authors: Ronen Gradwohl, Artyom Jelnov 

Publication date: 17 January 2025

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyevidencecredence goodsreview platform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Implementation with evidence
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Bad Reputation
• Seller Reputation
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Motivational ratings
• Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring
• Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
• Reputation Building under Observational Learning
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Equilibrium information in credence goods

Cited In (1)

• Equilibrium information in credence goods

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