Partial credence goods on review platforms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.002MaRDI QIDQ6665693zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ronen Gradwohl, Artyom Jelnov

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyevidencecredence goodsreview platform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Welfare-improving cascades and the effect of noisy reviews
• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• New, like new, or very good? Reputation and credibility

Cites work

• Bad Reputation
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems
• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• Implementation with evidence
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Motivational ratings
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Reputation Building under Observational Learning
• Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring
• Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
• Seller Reputation
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(1)

• Equilibrium information in credence goods

This page was built for publication: Partial credence goods on review platforms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6665693)