Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00250MaRDI QIDQ3044086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Asher Wolinsky

Publication date 10 August 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00250

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcontractsservice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• Expert-mediated sequential search
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• Price competition for an informed buyer
• Price competition under limited comparability

Cited in

(10)

• Credence goods, experts and risk aversion
• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• Expert-mediated sequential search
• Preventive-service fraud in credence good markets
• EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS
• Uncertain product availability in search markets
• Partial credence goods on review platforms
• Optimal search auctions
• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• Strategic framing to influence clients' risky decisions

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