Credence goods, experts and risk aversion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.05.033zbMATH Open1284.91314OpenAlexW2236704952MaRDI QIDQ2446271FDOQ2446271

Authors: Olivier Bonroy, Stéphane Lemarié, Jean-Philippe Tropeano 

Publication date: 16 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.033

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversioncredence goodsexpert services

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cited In (4)

• Equilibrium information in credence goods
• EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS
• Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
• Expert's reputation concern and consumer information

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