Expert's reputation concern and consumer information

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.08.004MaRDI QIDQ6637010zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hiromasa Ogawa

Publication date 12 November 2024

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

consumer informationcredence goodsreputation concern

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• Credence goods, experts and risk aversion
• Signalling, information and consumer fraud
• Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
• Equilibrium information in credence goods

Cites work

• Bad Reputation
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods

Cited in

(1)

• Undertreatment in credence goods markets: when does a no-liability rule outperform?

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