Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110854MaRDI QIDQ2096211zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yizheng Chen, Jingkui Li, Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 16 November 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110854

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyimperfect monitoringliabilityreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
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Cites work

• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(5)

• Reputation acquisition in imperfect financial markets
• Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
• EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS
• Partial credence goods on review platforms
• Brand spillovers as shadow enforcement: endogenous liability regimes in correlated experience goods markets

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