The role of commitment in repeated games

DOI10.1080/02331930600815991MaRDI QIDQ3426231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julio González-Díaz, Ignacio García-Jurado

Publication date 8 March 2007

Published in Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/02331930600815991

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationdelegation gamesfolk theoremsrepeated gamesunilateral commitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Commitment games
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• A commitment folk theorem
• Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games

Cites work

• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(15)

• Commitment games
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Essential collections for equilibrium concepts
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
• Transfers, contracts and strategic games
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
• A commitment folk theorem

This page was built for publication: The role of commitment in repeated games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3426231)