The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions

DOI10.1016/J.JMP.2021.102640MaRDI QIDQ2154153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hossam Zeitoun, Nick Chater, Tigran A. Melkonyan

Publication date 14 July 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102640

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentcredible threatssubgame perfectiontacit agreementvirtual bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Cognitive psychology (91E10)

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Control System Dynamics
• Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social control
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Playing for real. A text on game theory.
• Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Taking turns
• The bargaining problem
• The chain store paradox

Cited in

(2)

• Psychological contract model for knowledge collaboration in virtual community of practice: an analysis based on the game theory
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence

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