A Theory of Endogenous Commitment

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00470.XMaRDI QIDQ5438593zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guillermo Caruana, Liran Einav

Publication date 24 January 2008

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00470.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• The role of commitment in repeated games

Cited in

(20)

• (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
• Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs
• Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
• Bilateral commitment
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints
• Reputation building through costly adjustment
• The endowment effect on Academic chores trade-off (ACTO)
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• Cooperative decision making in cooperative control systems by means of game theory
• Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• Endogenous monetary commitment
• Games with switching costs and endogenous references
• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
• A continuum of commitment
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• A commitment folk theorem

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