Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1833MaRDI QIDQ2867480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shmuel Leshem, Avraham D. Tabbach

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1833

zbMATH Keywords

enforcementinspection gameStackelbergstrategic complementsstrategic substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(7)

• Games with partially enforceable agreements
• Macro meets micro: stochastic (Calvo) revisions in games
• Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Sophisticated enforcement and adaptive offenders
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Using capital mobility to enforce commitment

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