Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship

DOI10.2307/2297567MaRDI QIDQ3028670zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David P. Baron, David Besanko

Publication date 1987

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297567

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentfairnessmultiperiod modelregulated firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Regulation by reputation
• Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• On the dynamic optimality of yardstick regulation
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Cited in

(12)

• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task
• Time delay and the extraction of information rent in regulation
• Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
• Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
• What determines the power of a regulatory regime?
• A theory of soft capture
• Principal-agent models
• Optimal regulatory control of early contract termination
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
• Deregulation with consensus
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

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