Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.005zbMath1393.91103OpenAlexW2768625505MaRDI QIDQ1691359

Eric Cardella, Briggs Depew

Publication date: 16 January 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

learning-by-doingratchet effectoutput restrictionpiece-rate payreal-effort task

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Stata
• escftest

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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