Reputation building through costly adjustment

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.03.010MaRDI QIDQ2416007zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesc Dilmé

Publication date 23 May 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

reputationadjustment costsendogenous types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

• Reputation for Quality
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Optimal quality provision when reputation is subject to random inspections
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3322720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Reputation for Quality
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(7)

• Strategic real options
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620856 (Why is no real title available?)
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Habit forming consumers and firm dynamics
• Optimal quality provision when reputation is subject to random inspections
• Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
• Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

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