Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation

DOI10.2307/2171910MaRDI QIDQ4846696zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien, Pierre M. Picard

Publication date 12 May 1996

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9125.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

agency contractsimperfect competitionprecommitment effectsprincipal-agent theoryrenegotiationstrategic complementarityuninformed principals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

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Cited in

(11)

• Games played in a contracting environment
• Are two a good representative for many?
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
• The role of commitment in repeated games
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Unobservable contracts as precommitments

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