Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships

DOI10.2307/2951762MaRDI QIDQ3142740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Beaudry, Michel Poitevin

Publication date 20 December 1993

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2951762

zbMATH Keywords

contractsinformed principalone-shot signalling gamerenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Contractual signaling in a market environment
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting

Cited in

(22)

• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
• Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space
• Contractual signaling in a market environment
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
• A game of settlements in public contracts
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Contract negotiation and the Coase conjecture: a strategic foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Contract renewal under uncertainty
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

This page was built for publication: Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3142740)