Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
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Cites work
- A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
- Auction design without quasilinear preferences
- Composable and efficient mechanisms
- Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Knightian analysis of the Vickrey mechanism
- Liquid price of anarchy
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- On bargaining for an indivisible good
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- Polyhedral clinching auctions and the AdWords polytope
- Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations
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