Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
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Cited in
(25)- Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
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- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: a positive result
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- Efficient Auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
- Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
- Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
- Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects
- Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money
- Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
- Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers
- A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices
- Auctioning off a non-rivalrous good with interference
- Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects
- Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: structural properties and the serial Vickrey mechanism
- Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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